Aggregate signature can combine n signatures on n messages from n users into single signature, and the verifier should be convinced by the aggregate signature that n users indeed sign n messages. 
Introduction
The aggregate signature can aggregate n signatures on n messages from n distinct users to a single signature. The notion of aggregate signature was introduced by Boneh et al. [1] firstly in Eurocrypt 2003. The aggregate signature can convince the verifier that n users indeed sign n original messages. Aggregate signature is useful to reduce bandwidth and storage. Hence, in some resource constrained environment such as Vehicular Ad hoc Networks [2] and Body Area Networks [3] , it can be applied to reduce the cost of computation and communication.
In Asiacrypt 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [4] proposed the notion of certificateless public key cryptography and certificateless signature, which can simplify management problems of complicated certificate in traditional public key cryptography and overcome inherent problem of escrow key in identity-based public key cryptography. In the certificateless cryptography environment, to satisfy the above application, Castro and Dahab [5] presented the concept of certificateless aggregate signature (CLAS) and Gong et al., [6] redefined the security model of certificateless aggregate signature. Later, Zhang et al., [7] proposed a new certificateless aggregate signature scheme and perfected Gong's certificateless aggregate signature security model, but the efficiency of their schemes [6] [7] is lower. Afterwards, researchers proposed several schemes with less pairings or fixed signature's length [8] [9] [10] [11] . Recently, Liu et al., [12] proposed another new construction of efficient certificateless aggregate signature scheme which only spent 3 pairings and is proven existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Unfortunately,
Preliminaries
This section introduces basic concepts of bilinear pairing, computational DiffeHellman problem, and the formal model of certificateless aggregate signature.
Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group with prime order p, G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order and P be a generator of G 1 . Let e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
⑴ The map e is bilinear: for all P, Q∈G 1 , a, b∈Z q * , e(aP,bQ)=e(P,Q) ab . ⑵ The map e is non-degenerate: there exists P∈G 1 , Q∈G 1 , so that e(P,Q)≠1. ⑶ The map e is computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q∈G 1 .
We say that (G 1 ,G 2 ) are bilinear groups if there exists the bilinear mapping e:G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 as above. Bilinear pairings can be constructed from the Weil pairing or the Tate pairing.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Given (P, aP, bP), for unknown a, b∈Z q * , compute abP. The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in
Component of Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme
In this subsection, we review the definition of certificateless aggregation signature given in [6] [7] . In general, certificateless aggregate signature scheme considers seven algorithms as following:
It is a probabilistic polynomial algorithm which takes a security parameter k as input and returns a master secret key s, master public key P pub and a list of system parameters params.  Aggregate-Sign: It is a deterministic polynomial algorithm which takes n user's identity ID i , the corresponding public key PK i and signature σ i on message m i as input and returns an aggregate signature σ on messages {m 1 ,…,m n }.

Aggregate-Verify: It is deterministic polynomial algorithm which takes params, the identities set {ID 1 ,…,ID n }, the corresponding public key set {PK 1 ,…,PK n } and an aggregate signature σ on messages {m 1 ,…,m n } as input, then outputs either accept or reject. In above algorithms, certificateless signature scheme includes previous five algorithms and certificateless aggregation signature scheme includes all of the algorithms. In certificateless signature scheme and certificateless aggregation signature scheme, two types of adversaries are considered: Type I adversary A I and Type II adversary A II . The adversary A I represents a normal attacker. He cannot access to the master secret key s to get the partial private key D i , but he has ability to replace any user's public key with a value of his choice. The adversary A II represents a KGC. KGC has access to the master key and knows all partial private key D i , but does not replace the target user's public key.
Adversaries Model of Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme
We define game I for A I and game II for A II . Game I: Let B be the game challenger and k be a security parameter. Challenger B executes algorithm Setup and generates the system parameters params and a master secret key s. Challenger B holds s and sends params to A I . During the simulating between B and A I , the following oracles can be accessed. ① Hash-Query: A I can access the rights of all of hash query in the certificateless aggregation signature scheme and achieve the corresponding hash's values. ② PartialKey-Query: B executes the algorithm PartialKey-Gen to generate the partial private key D i and returns it to A I when A I queries the partial private key of target identity ID i .
③ PublicKey-Query: B executes the algorithm UserKey-Gen to generate the public key PK i and returns it to A I when A I queries the public key of target identity ID i .
④ More details of the security of certificateless aggregate signature scheme can be found in [6] [7] .
Review of Liu et al.'s Certificateless Aggregate Signature Scheme
In this section, we briefly review Liu et al.'s certificateless aggregate signature scheme [12] . The scheme consists of following algorithms: Setup, PartialKey-Gen, UserKey-Gen, Partial-Sign, Aggregate-Sign and Aggregate-Verify. The detail of algorithms is described as follows.
Setup: Given a security parameter l, the algorithm works as follows by KGC. ⑴ Generates a cyclic additive group G 1 and a cyclic multiplicative group G 2 with prime order q, different generators P and S in G 1 and define bilinear pairing e: For an aggregating set of n users with identities {ID 1 ,…,ID n }, the corresponding public keys {P 1 ,…,P n }, and message-signature pairs{(m 1 ,R 1 ,U 1 ),…,(m n ,R n ,U n )}, the aggregator computes 
Aggregate-Verify:
The verifier verifies the value of the aggregate signature (R 1 , … R n , U) to determine whether the aggregate signature signed by n users, and verifier performs the following steps:
⑵ Checks whether the equation 
Security-Analysis of Liu et al's Scheme
Liu et al. [9] claimed their certificateless aggregate signature scheme is secure against Tpye II adversary A II . Unfortunately, the scheme is insecure. A II can forge partial signature (R i ,U i ) on message m i under the identity ID i and the corresponding public key P i , he also can aggregate the individually imitative signature (R i ,U i ) to generate the final aggregate signature(R 1 ,…,R n ,U) which is verified by aggregate-verify algorithm. In this section, we give concrete and simple attacks to show Liu et al.'s scheme is insecurity. The following will show how type II adversary KGC makes ordinary-passive attack and malicious-active attack.
 KGC Attack I Since λ is KGC's master secret key and the computing equation r i P T = r i λP=λR i is correct, KGC can computer λR i and get r i P T . Meanwhile, KGC knows users' partial secret key D i , he can compute
. Since KGC knows constant x i S, he can forge user's certificateless signature on any messages and aggregate a collection of forged signatures to form forged certificateless aggregate signatures. This attack shows that KGC is an ordinary-passive attacker in Liu et al.'s scheme. The detail of attack is described as follows.
Intercept partial-signature. During a concrete application, the user U i whose identity is ID i with corresponding public key P i signs the message m * and computes the partialsignature (R * ,V * ). Then, KGC intercepts this signature by some cryptanalysis methods. Compute Fixed Value. KGC performs the following steps to compute fixed value x i S. 
, outputs ( , ) ii RV  as the signature on m ' .
The forged signature ( , ) ii RV  is valid because the following verification equation is correct. ' ' ' 
Analysis of Possible Reasons
According to our analysis, the security of Liu In this paper, we analyze scheme's security and demonstrate two kinds of concrete attacks. Since type II adversary KGC can compute fixed value r i P T and x i S, he can make ordinary-passive attack and malicious-active attack, and impersonate any user to forge legal certificateless signature and certificateless aggregate signature on any messages. We will propose an improved scheme in the future to overcome the security weakness of Liu et al's scheme.
